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COMMENTARY

INFORMATION, PRIVILEGE,
OPPORTUNITY AND INSIDER
TRADING
ROBERT W. MCGEE*
WALTER E. BLOCK**

I. BACKGROUND OF INSIDER TRADING LEGISLATION
Insider trading legislation requires insiders to publicly report their
trades through securities commissions and prohibits them from using
confidential, undisclosed information that is material to the value of
securities in connection with the trades.' In Canada, insider trading
is both a civil and quasi-criminal offense. 2 In the United States, Rule
lob-5 of the Sectfities Exchange Act is often cited as authority for
prosecuting insider trading cases.,
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POLOAtIoRs PkuetPuLEg A
1. F.H. BtUCKLEY Ab MQ, C6IN0LLY, C6koa
icms 657 (1988) [hereinafter PRIeipLES AND POLIIES]. Chapter 8 of this book gives
one of the best presentations of insider trading, froth both an economic and legal
perspective. Both Canadian and United States laws are daictssed.
2. Id. For civil sanctions, see OSA i3i(l)-(2), (4) and CBCA § 125(5)(a)-(b),
For criminal treatment of insidef trading, see USA § 75.
3. 17 C.fF.R, § 240.lOb-5 (1989). Rule 1Ob-5 addresses the employfment of
manipulative and deceptive devices. it states:
it shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in orfder to make the statements made, .. not
misieading, or
(c) To engage in any act, praetice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connectioh with the
purchase or sale of any security.
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One of the earliest and most important cases involving insider
trading was SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 4 In this case, the
company's geologist discovered valuable mineral deposits in Ontario,
Canada in 1959. In late 1963, company drilling discovered evidence
that there might be rich deposits of copper and zinc at the spot in
question. After the geologist notified management of the find, the
company's officers, directors and employees began buying shares of
the company's stock on the open market, before the find was known
to the general public. Other individuals who were not connected with
the company also bought shares before the information became public.
Those individuals who were connected with the company were named
in a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) complaint. The others
involved were not prosecuted by the SEC, but some of them later
became parties to private civil actions.
By early 1964, word began to spread and the stock's price began
to climb. On April 12 of that year, the company announced that it
was working in the area in question, but more drilling would be
required before a proper evaluation could be made. Four days after
that announcement, Texas Gulf announced a major strike. In its suit,
the SEC alleged that between the time of the "misleading" press
release of April 12 and the accurate announcement four days later,
many shareholders sold their stock for prices that were lower than
what they would have sold them for if they had known the information
that was announced on April 16. Insiders acquired shares during this
period, but the number of shares they acquired during the twentytwo week period in question represented less than 10% of the total
shares traded during that timespan. The share price doubled within
three weeks after the announcement of April 16. The appellate court
held that:
not only are directors or management officers of corporation
'insiders' within meaning of rule of Securities and Exchange
Commission, so as to be precluded from dealing in stock of
corporation, but [the] rule is also applicable to one possessing
information, though he may not be strictly termed an 'insider'
within meaning of Securities Exchange Act, and thus anyone
in possession of material inside information is an 'insider' and
must either disclose it to investing public, or, if he is disabled
from disclosing it in order to protect corporate confidence, or
he chooses not to do so, must abstain from trading in or

4. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
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recommending securities concerned while such inside information remains undisclosed.'
A.

THE CONCEPT OF JUSTICE

Before proceeding further, a definition of justice would be appropriate. Once justice is defined, the definition can be applied to the
practice of insider trading to determine whether the practice is just.
A just act can be between individuals or between the state and one
or more individuals although, in the final analysis, an act involving
the state is carried out by an individual. According to one popular
theory, justice is the absence of coercion; acts between consenting
adults are just. Individuals or governments who prevent such acts are
acting unjustly, and individuals who commit acts that aggress against
6
others, except in self-defense, are acting unjustly. A corollary to this
view is that the proper scope of government is to protect life, liberty,
and property, and any act by government that goes beyond this scope
results in injustice because it must necessarily use coercion to take
from some to give to others. 7 Space does not permit a detailed defense
of this position, but others have already discussed the point thoroughly.8
If injustice results when one individual takes the property of
another without that person's consent, and the proper scope of
government includes prevention of such acts, then government should
attempt to prevent coercive (or fraudulent) takings and should refrain
from interfering in nonfraudulent transactions that are between consenting adults. In the case of insider trading, the SEC might be the
proper agency of government to prevent such transactions, if insider
5. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
6. Robert Nozick's and Murray N. Rothbard's definitions are along the same
lines, but John Rawls' is not. For an elaboration of various theories of justice, see

R.

NozICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA

LIBERTY

(1982); J.

A

RAWLS,

(1974); M. ROTHARD, THE ETHICS OF
B. BARRY, THE LIBERAL THEORY

THEORY OF JUSTICE;

(1973); 0. BIRD, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE (1967). Perhaps the most detailed
bibliography on the theory of justice, at least for books first published before 1900,

OF JUSTICE

is in 1 THE

GREAT IDEAS:

A

SYNTOPICON

850-79 (R. Hutchins ed. 1952).

7. A similar view is taken by John Locke in his THE SECOND TREATISE ON
CIVIL GOVERNMENT (1986) and at least some of America's founding fathers. The view
NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974);
TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985);

is also developed in R.
THE LAW
BROUGHT

(1950); and D. RUSSELL,
Up To DATE (1985).

8. See

GOVERNMENT

AND

NOZICK, EPSTEIN, BASTAT and RUSSELL,

R.

F.

LEGAL PLUNDER:

supra note 7.

EPSTEIN,
BASTIAT,

BASTIAT
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trading is deemed to be an unjust act. However, at least one former
SEC Commissioner has pointed out the potential abuses that can
occur when the SEC is given such regulatory authority, 9 as have
others.' 0 Some commentators have even questioned the constitutionality of SEC enforcement actions. I" Perhaps regular common law
9. See R.

KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES

& EXCHANGE
(1982).
10. For more on SEC regulatory abuses, see Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181 (1985);

COMMISSION VERSUS CORPORATE AMERICA

G.

LITTLER, ABOLISH THE

SEC, in L.H.

ROCKWELL, JR.,

THE

FREE MARKET READER
NETWORK 1

273 (1988); Bubb, SEC Regulations Endanger Free Press, 4 FREE PRESS

(Spring 1985); Freedman, A Civil Libertarian Looks at Securities Regulation, 35 OHIo
ST.

L.J. 280 (1974); McMenamin & Gorenc, Jr., Subverting the First Amendment,

23 (Jan. 1983); The First Amendment and Federal Securities Regulations: A
Symposium, 20 CONN. L. REv. 261-477 (1988); Comment, The Right to a Free Press
and the Regulation of Securities Newsletters: The Controversy Continues 56 U. CIN.
Li Ev. 1445 (1988)i A whole body of literatUre is developing aroUnd the Lowe
deCisio. For soie reent artiles on this case, see Anian, SEC v. Lowe: Professional
Regulation and the First Amendment, 1985 Sup. CT. REv, 93 (1985); Coffhafl, Lowe
v. Securities and Exchange Commission: The Deterioration of Financial Newsletter
Reguiationj 10 NOVA L.i 1267 (1986); Desch, Lowe v. SEC: Guaranteeingthe Right
to Publish InvestmeNt Newsletters Through Statutory Construction, 64 WASH. U.LQ.
57 (1986); Draughdon, SEC v. Lowe. Redefining the
Fide Newspaper Exclusion,
1ona
14 SEt; R.o. LJ,.291 (1981)i Carveri Lowe v. SEc: The First AmeNdmeNt
i
Sttus
of investment Advice Newslettersj 35 AM. U.L. REv. 1253 (1986)i Oora, Supreme
court Report: Five Wins and Nine Lo~ses fo Fee Speech Fans, 71 A.iA. 1 116
(1985); Law, Regulation of Investmient Newsletter Publishers rhe SEC'S Power
Reaches a New 'LOweL," I1VT. L. RmV. 175 (1986), Lee, The Effects of Lowe on
the Application of the Investments Advisers Act of 1940 to Impersonal Investment
Advisory Publications, 42 Bus. LAW. 507 (1987); Levant, Financial Columnists as
Investgent Advisers After Lowe and Cdpenter, 74 CALW. L. REV. 206i (1986);
Mohri, Lowe v. SEC;: Avoidance of the Commercial Speech Definition-The Right
Result for the Wrong Reasons, 17 U. Tot. Li REv. 1007 (1986); Nitesi The SEC's
Regulation of the Financial Press: The Legal Implications of the Misappropriation
Theory, 52 BROOKLYN L. Rv. 43 (1986); Noqiquist, SEC v. LoWe: The Constitutionality of Prohibiting Publication of Iniestment NewSletters Under the Investment
Advisers Act, 69 MINN. L; REv. 937 (1985)i Thompson, Lowe v. SEC Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 Clashes with First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and
REASON

Press, 21 U. RicH. Li REV. 205 (1986).

11. See Mofrisoh v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988); SEC v. Jetry T; O'Bfienl,

inc., 467 U.. 735 (1984); Blinder, Robinsoh & Co,, ific.
v. SEC, 837 F,2d 1099
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 177 (1988); SEC v. Blinder, Robinson & Co,,
Iic. 511 F. Supp. 799 (1981);, Balbonri, Section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Act of

1933-SEC v. Blinder Robinson & Co. -Proposed Standards for FairnessHearings,
17 NEW ENd, Li RE1V. 1397 (1981); Falon, On LegislatiVe courts, Administative
Agencies, and Article I, 101 HAkv. L. REV. 916 (1988); MeLueas & Rotlatiwich,
SEC Enforcement Proceedings Under Section 15(c)(4) of the Securities Etchange Act
of 1934, 41 Bus. LAW. 145 (1985); Steiaibeeg, SEC Subpoena Enforcement Pactice,
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contract and tort would be sufficient to protect individuals from
harm. Property law may also be used, given that insider information
2
has been identified as a property right.'
Lowe v. SEC3 illustrates the potential abuse of free speech that
might result when the SEC is given the authority to regulate securities
trading. In Lowe, the SEC attempted to prevent an "unsavory"
individual from publishing a newsletter that gave investment advice
and commentary, alleging that he violated the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940. The district court held that his right to publish was
protected by the first amendment and that he should be permitted to
publish as long as he complied with the provisions of the Act.' 4 The
Supreme Court held that Lowe did not have to be a registered
investment adviser to publish his newsletter because the information
was given impersonally to anyone who subscribed rather than on a
person-to-person basis.' 5
Whether insider trading is fraudulent is questionable. St. Thomas
Aquinas said that fraud can be perpetrated in three ways, either by
selling one thing for another or by giving the wrong quality or
quantity. 6 A more modern definition is "intentional deception to
cause a person to give up property or some lawful right.' '1 7 A more
general definition is that fraud is perpetrated when a person knowingly
or intentionally makes a false representation of fact to another with
the intent that the other party rely on the representation, and that the
other party actually did rely upon the false statement to his loss,
detriment or damage.' 8 Some courts have extended liability to include
11 J. CoRP. L. 1 (1985); Note, SEC Investigations-SECNeed Not Notify Target of

Third-party Subpoenas-SEC v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 2720, 75 J.CRIM.
L. & CRMNOLOGY 940 (1984); SEC vs. the Constitution, Wall Street Journal, Dec.
6, 1988, at A-24, col. 1.

12. See Manne, Insider Trading and Property Rights in New Information, 4
reprinted in ECONOMIc LIBERTIES AND THE JUDIcIARY 317-27

CATO J. 933 (1985),

(Dorn and Manne eds. 1987); Morgan, Insider Trading and the Infringement of
Property Rights, 48 Omo ST. L.J. (1987).
13. 472 U.S. 181 (1985).
14. 556 F. Supp. 1359 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
15. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 211 (1985).
16. G. DALCOURT, THE PHMIOSOPHY AND WRITINGS OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS
105 (1965); ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SuMMA THEOLOGICA, Pf. II-II, Q.77 Art. 3, obj. 4

(Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans. 1947).

17. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE (college
ed. 1964).
18. Kaufman Inv. Corp. v. Johnson, 623 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 914 (1981); Meader v. Francis Ford, Inc., 286 Or. 451, 595 P.2d 480 (1979);
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negligent or inadvertent misrepresentation. 9 According to this theory,
there is no fraud if there is no loss. And because much so-called
insider trading does not involve any identifiable loss, the practice is
not fraudulent. Even in cases where there is loss, it still has to be
proved that all the elements of fraud are present before an inside
trader can be found guilty of the offense.
A typical case of insider trading occurs when a buyer with inside
information calls his stock broker and tells him to buy, knowing that
the stock price is likely to rise as soon as the inside information
becomes public. In this case, the buyer does not deceive the seller
into giving up property. Indeed, the buyer does not even know who
the seller is, and the seller would have sold anyway, anonymously.
The seller's action would have been the same whether or not an inside
trader was the other party to the transaction. If the inside trader had
not purchased the stock, someone else would have. Yet this "someone
else" would not be accused of reaping unjust profits even if the
identical stock was purchased for the same price the insider would
have paid. Consequently, insider trading does not seem to fit the
definition of fraud.
According to Aquinas, there is no moral duty to inform a
potential buyer that the price of the good one is trying to sell is likely
to change in the near future. 20 Aquinas discusses a wheat merchant
who:
carr[ies] wheat to a place where wheat fetches a high price,
knowing that many will come after him carrying wheat; . ..
if the buyers knew this they would give a lower price. But...
the seller need not give the buyer this information .... [T]he
seller, since he sells his goods at the price actually offered
him, does not seem to act contrary to justice through not
stating what is going to happen. If however he were to do so,
or if he lowered his price, it would be exceedingly virtuous on
his part: although he does not seem to be bound to do this as
a debt of justice."
Metal Tech. Corp. v. Metal Techniques Co., Inc., 74 Or. App. 297, 703 P.2d 237
(1985); 2 RESTATEMENT (Second) of Torts § 525ff, cited in Foley, "Insider Trading":
The Moral Issue, 37 THE FREEMAN 409 n.7 (1987).

19. Weiss v. Gumbert, 191 Or. 119, 227 P.2d 812, reh'g denied, 191 Or. 139.,
228 P.2d 800 (1951); 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 552-552C, cited in Foley,
"Insider Trading": The Moral Issue, 37 THE FREEMAN 409 n.8 (1987).
20. SuMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 16; Barath, The Just Price and the Costs
of ProductionAccording to St. Thomas Aquinas, 34 NEW SCHOLASTICISM 420 (1960);
Bartell, Value, Price, and St. Thomas 25 THE THOMIST, 359-60 (1962).
21. SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 16, Obj. 4, Reply Obj. 4.
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A similar example is discussed by Cicero where a merchant is
bringing grain from Alexandria to Rhodes. He knows that the residents of Rhodes are starving and that other grain merchants will
arrive shortly. If he discloses22 this fact, the price for his own grain
will fall. Should he disclose?
An insider who knows the stock price is likely to change in the
near future has no "moral" duty to inform potential buyers of this
fact. Where there is no moral duty, certainly there should be no legal
duty either. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled at least twice
that those in possession of nonpublic information do not have a
general duty to disclose the information to the marketplace. 23 The
22. CICERO, Tim OmcEs Bk. III, ch. xiii (E. Rhys ed. 1909). Lawson discusses
this passage in The Ethics of Insider Trading, 11 HARv. J.L. & Pun. POL'Y 727, 73839 (1988). This passage is also mentioned in Barry, The Economics of Outside
Information and Rule 10b-5, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1307, 1361 n.206 (1981). For a
critique of the Lawson article, see Macey, Comment: Ethics, Economics, and Insider
Trading: Ayn Rand Meets the Theory of the Firm, 11 HARv. J.L. PUB. POL'Y 785
(1988). The passage from Cicero, as cited in Lawson, is as follows:
'I have imported my stock,' Diogenes' merchant will say; 'I have
offered it for sale; I sell at a price no higher than my competitors-perhaps
even lower, when the market is overstocked, Who is wronged?'
'What say you?' comes Antipater's argument on the other side; 'it is
your duty to consider the interests of your fellow-men and to serve society;
you were brought into the world under these conditions and have these
inborn principles which you are in duty bound to obey and follow, that
your interest shall be the interest of the community and conversely that the
interest of the community shall be your interest as well; will you, in view
of all these facts, conceal from your fellow-men what relief in plenteous
supplies is close at hand for them?'
'It is one thing to conceal,' Diogenes will perhaps reply; 'not to reveal
is quite a different thing. At this present moment I am not concealing from
you, even if I am not revealing to you, the nature of the goods or the
highest good; and to know these secrets would be of more advantage to you
than to know that the price of wheat was down. But I am under no
obligation to tell you everything that it may be to your interest to be told.'
'Yea, Antipater will say, 'but you are, as you must admit, if you will
only bethink you of the bonds of fellowship forged by Nature and existing
between man and man.'
'I do not forget them,' the other will reply; 'but do you mean to say
that those bonds of fellowship are such that there is no such thing as private
property? If that is the case, we should not sell anything at all but freely
give everything away.'
23. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980) (silence in connection
with the purchase or sale of securities may operate as a fraud only where there is a
duty to disclose that arises from a relationship of trust and confidence between the
parties to the transaction); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). See also Macey, The
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Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that a corporation has
no duty to disclose tentative merger plans to stockholders before it
buys their stock. 24
In Chiarellav. United States,2 the Supreme Court held that "one
who fails to disclose material information prior to the consummation
of a transaction commits fraud only when he is under a duty to do
S0. ''26 Chiarella was an employee of a printing company. Part of his
job was to print confidential documents for corporations. In the
course of his employment, he was able to determine that certain
companies were going to be the target of takeovers and he bought
stock in those companies. He did not have any fiduciary relationship
to the company's stockholders. The Supreme Court held that he was
not guilty of violating Rule lOb-5 because he did not commit any
fraud against the party who sold him the stock. 27
In Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission,2 8 the Supreme
Court held that the insiders have a fiduciary duty to the shareholders
and must either disclose material inside information or not trade in
the securities of the corporation. 29 It also held that a tippee who
SEC's Insider Trading Proposal: Good Politics, Bad Policy (Cato Institute Policy
Analysis No. 101 Mar. 31, 1988). For a discussion of these two cases, see Aldave,
Misappropriation: A General Theory of Liability For Trading on Nonpublic Information, 13 HOFSTRA L. REv. 101 (1984); Heller, Chiarella, SEC Rule 14e-3 and
Dirks: Fairness Versus Economic Theory, 37 Bus. LAW. 517 (1982); Morgan, Insider
Trading and the Infringement of Property Rights, 48 Omo ST. L.J. 79 (1987). For
other discussions of Chiarella and the misappropriation theory, see Anderson, Fraud,
Fiduciaries, and Insider Trading, 10 HOFSTRA L. RPv. 341 (1982); Branson, Discourse
on the Supreme Court Approach to SEC Rule lOb-5 and Insider Trading, 30 EMORY
L.J. 263 (1981); Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A PostChiarella Restatement, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1982); Macey, From Fairness to Contract:
The New Direction of the Rules Against Insider Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REv. 9
(1984); Martin, Insider Trading and the Misappropriation Theory: Has the Second
Circuit Gone Too Far? 61 ST. Jon's L. REv. 78 (1986); Morgan, The Insider
Trading Rules After Chiarella: Are They Consistent with Statutory Policy? 33
HASnNas L.J. 1407 (1982). For a summary of the literature on the "wrongness" of
insider trading, see generally B. RIDER & L. FFRENCH, THE REGULATION OF INSIDER
TRADING (1979). Other discussions on the subject may be found in Brudney, Insiders,
Outsiders and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93
HARv. L. REv. 322 (1979); Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66
VA. L. REv. 1 (1980); Scott, Insider Trading, Rule lob-5, Disclosure and Corporate
Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 801 (1980).
24. Taylor v. First Union Corp. of So. Carolina, 857 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1988).
25. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
26. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980).
27. Id. at 234-35.
28. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).

29. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653 (1983).
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receives material nonpublic information from an insider and trades
on it violates Rule lOb-5 if the insider breaches any fiduciary duty by
disclosing the information, provided the tippee either knew or should
have known that there was a breach. 30 But an insider is deemed to
breach a duty only if he personally benefits from the disclosure, either
directly or indirectly. Dirks was a securities analyst. He received his
inside information from a company's employees who told him that
the company was engaged in massive fraud. Dirks told his clients to
sell their stock in the company. The employees who told Dirks the
insider information did not act for personal gain. They wanted to
expose the fraud. Because the employees did not breach a fiduciary
duty to any shareholders, Dirks could not be found guilty of violating
Rule lOb-5.
Chiarellaand Dirks represent a major split with the SEC because
these cases held that there is no general duty to disclose nonpublic
information. The SEC had been contending that the law required
information between traders to be equal, based on the flawed decision
in Texas Gulf Sulphur.3 In Taylor v. First Union Corp. of So.
3 2 the Fourth Circuit held that neither the acquiring nor the
Carolina,
selling corporation has a duty to tell shareholders that they are
engaging in merger discussions. 3
B.

WHOSE RIGHTS ARE VIOLATED BY INSIDER TRADING?

While the transaction of buying and selling stock by an insider
does not meet either the dictionary's or Aquinas' definition of fraud,
the question of justice still remains. If no one's rights are violated,
the act is not unjust; if someone's rights are violated, the act is
unjust. The obvious question to raise is: Whose rights are violated by
insider trading?
The most obvious potential "victims" of insider trading are the
potential sellers who sell their stock anonymously to an inside trader.
But, as was mentioned above, they would have sold anyway; whether
the inside trader buys from them or not does not affect the proceeds
they receive from the sale.3 4 If the sellers are hurt by having an inside
trader in the market, it is difficult to measure the damage, and it
appears that there is none. In fact, academic literature recognizes that
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
1, at 661.

Id. at 660.
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
857 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1988).
Taylor v. First Union Corp. of So. Carolina, 857 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1988).
This privity argument is discussed in PRINCIPLES AND PoLIcIES, supra note
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insider trading does not result in any harm to any identifiable group, 35
and those who sell to inside traders may actually be helped rather
than harmed because they received a better price.36 Therefore, it
appears illogical to allow them to sue for damages if, in fact, there
are no damages.17 In any event, there appears to be no violation of
anyone's rights in such instances of insider trading.
It has been argued that employers are harmed by insider trading
because employees misappropriate corporate information for personal
gain. 8 Yet employers whose employees misappropriate information
for personal gain have a remedy at law already. If anyone sues, it
should be the employer that sues the employee. Government should
not be a party to such a lawsuit, because it is a private rights violation
rather than a public harm that has been committed, if in fact any
rights violation has been committed at all. Yet there has been little
private restriction on trading on insider information. 9 Some authors
have gone so far as to state that the gains derived from insider trading
are equivalent to compensation that a corporation would otherwise
pay to corporate officers for their entrepreneurial expertise,4 and that
employers are not harmed at all by insider trading. Buckley points
out that many commentators do not agree with this compensation
argument, but widespread disagreement does not mean that the compensation argument is not valid, at least in many cases. 4'
35. Manne, supra note 12 at 934.
36. See PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, supra note 1, at 689.
37. See Carlton & Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L.
REv. 857, 868 (1983); Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary
Privileges, and the Productionof Information, 1981 Sup. CT. REV. 309, 335; Morgan,
Insider Trading and the Infringement of Property Rights, 48 Omo ST. L.J. 79, 10708 (1987).

38. See Martin, Insider Trading and the Misappropriation Theory: Has the
Second Circuit Gone Too Far?, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 78 (1986); Morgan, Insider
Trading and the Infringement of Property Rights, 48 OIo ST. L.J. 79 (1987); Scott,
Insider Trading: Rule lob-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD.
801 (1980).
39. See Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV.
1 (1980); Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and
the Production of Information, 1981 Sup. CT. REV. 309.
40. See H. MANNE, INSIDE INFORMATION AND THE ENTREPRENEUR 132-35 (1966);
H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 138-41 (1966); Carlton and
Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 858, 876 (1983);

Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 Sup. CT. REV. 309, 332; Scott, Insider Trading: Rule lOb5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 801, 808 (1980); Manne,
Insider Trading and the Stock Market (JSD dissertation, Yale University, 1966).
41. See PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, supra note 1, at 680.
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WHAT ARE THE BENEFICIAL EFFECTS OF INSIDER TRADING?

Insider trading serves as a means of communicating market
information, which makes markets more efficient.4 2 When insiders are
seen trading, it acts as a signal to others that a stock's price will likely
move in a certain direction. If, for example, a director of General
Motors purchases a large quantity of that company's stock, that act
reveals evidence that the stock's price is likely to rise in the near
future. Likewise, if the director sells, it is likely that the price will
soon fall. A chain reaction will take place as the brokerage firm
handling the transaction alerts other brokers and clients, and the stock
price will start moving in the correct direction, closer to its true value.
There is no need to make a public announcement, because the market
reacts almost immediately. Even if the insider is anonymous, an
increase (or decrease) in demand for a particular stock will be noticed
by the market, and the price will move accordingly. Placing prohibitions on insider trading has the effect of blocking this flow of
information. Insiders will attempt to hide their trades, or perhaps not
make them at all, thus preventing the market from learning this
valuable information.
The potential acquirer in a takeover attempt may also benefit by
insider trading. The investment banker hired by the acquirer may leak
information to arbitragers, who then accumulate shares in the target
company with the intent of tendering them shortly thereafter. The
result is that the takeover's chances of success are increased, and the
benefit as a result of the investment banker's
acquirer may actually
43
alleged misconduct.
The necessary separation of management from owners, inherent
in all large corporations, has caused corporate management to be
unresponsive to the wishes of corporate stockholders. Management
can make decisions based on self-interest rather than shareholder
interest with little fear of reprisal because it is easier for shareholders
to sell their stock than to fight management decisions. This fact of
corporate life is not new. It has been true ever since owners became
separated from managers."
42. Manne, supra note 12. See also Carlton & Fischel, The Regulation of
Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 866-72 (1983); Kelly, Nardinelli & Wallace,
Regulation of Insider Trading: Rethinking SEC Policy Rules, 7 CATO J. 441 (1987);
Morgan, Insider Trading and the Infringement of Property Rights, 48 OHIO ST. L.J.
79, 105 (1987); Wu, An Economist Looks at Section 16 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 260, 266 (1968).
43. Herzel & Katz, Insider Trading: Who Loses?, LLOYDs BANK REv. 15, 25
(July 1987).
44. For one of the first accounts of this phenomenon, see A. BERLE & G.
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The (relatively) free market economy of the United States has
found a way to pierce the protective veil that insulates unresponsive
management from the wrath of small shareholders -the takeover.
The corporate takeover is practically the only way that entrenched
management can be shaken up and either forced to be responsive to
shareholder interests or fired. This market for corporate control does
not exist to any great extent in any country except the United States,
which provides a competitive advantage over other countries because
the threat of takeover provides corporate management an extra incentive to work for shareholder interests rather than its own. Thus,
shareholders of United States companies receive a higher return on
investment than can investors in companies that are not subject to a
takeover threat, all other things being equal. 45 The attack on Drexel
Burnham, and the threat of an attack on anyone else who tries to
facilitate the market for corporate control with junk bonds, is bound
to harm the market for corporate control and thus decrease the
already weak voice that shareholders have. Management of companies
that do not have to fear a takeover will have less incentive to be
efficient, which also hurts employees and consumers.
The shareholders who sell at the time the arbitragers are buying
may also benefit. The increased demand generated by the arbitragers
increases the price the sellers receive when they sell. Without the
leakage of the insider information to the arbitragers, the demand for
the stock in question would have been lower, so the sellers (who
would probably have sold anyway) would have received a somewhat
lower price for their stock." Shareholders who do not sell also benefit
because the price of their shares rises as a result of insider trading.
A goal of most corporate managements is to increase shareholder
wealth-in other words, increase the stock's price. Because insider
trading has a tendency to increase the stock's price, inside traders
assist management in achieving its goal. Inside traders may benefit
the corporation in another way as well.
A decision by the board or its delegates to 'tip' inside corporate
information to certain outsiders, to facilitate trading by them,
could also be in the best interests of the corporation. For
MEANs, Tm MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY

(1932), cited in Manne

& Ribstein, The SEC v. The American Shareholder, NATIONAL REVIEw, 26, 27 (Nov.
25, 1988) [hereinafter American Shareholder].
45. Manne and Ribstein make this point. See American Shareholder, supra
note 44, at 29.
46. See

PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES,

supra note 1, at 689.
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example, where the corporation has received valuable services
from an outsider, one way of providing indirect compensation
for those services is by providing the outsider with the authorized use of inside information owned by the corporation.
Thus, if one accepts the notion that inside information is
property of the corporation, even the tipping of that information to others ought not be regarded as improper, if the
board of directors or other authorized corporate decision
maker has determined that such tipping is in the best interests
47
of the corporation.
D.

WHO IS HARMED BY PROHIBITIONS ON INSIDER TRADING?

Who is harmed by prohibitions on insider trading? The obvious
answer is the inside traders themselves. If insider trading is not viewed
as "immoral," then punishing insiders by preventing them from using
their knowledge becomes an unjust act in itself.
There is a case to be made that the company's shareholders may
be harmed by placing prohibitions on insider trading.4 s For example,
the Williams Act, the part of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
that requires anyone contemplating a tender offer to announce the
intention well in advance (sections 13d and e, and sections 14d, e,
and f), makes it easier for target managements to thwart a takeover.
Several authors have argued that shareholders tend to benefit by
takeovers. Therefore, making it easier to thwart a takeover may be
49
against the stockholders' interest.
47. Morgan, Insider Trading and the Infringement of Property Rights, 48 Omo

ST. L.J. 70, 98 (1987).

48. Carlton & Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REv.
857, 866-72 (1983). Stockholders often like to do business with an inside trader.
Buckley relates the story of one broker who was suspended for 20 days as punishment
for participating in insider trading. The broker used his time off to vacation in
Florida. Upon his return, he was "busier than ever, pursued by clients who thought
he was precisely the kind of broker they wanted." PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, supra
note 1, at 696.
49. A number of authors have addressed this point in recent years. See Bubb,
Hostile Acquisitions and the Restructuring of CorporateAmerica, 36 TIE FREEMAN
166 (1986); Buttarazzi, Corporate Takeovers: What is the FederalRole?, 606 BACKGROUNDER (The Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C., Sept. 29, 1987); Coffee,
Grundfest, Romano & Weidenbaum, Corporate Takeovers: Who Wins; Who Loses;
Who Should Regulate?, 88 REGULATION 23 (1988); Jarell, Brickley & Netter, The
Market for CorporateControl: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980, J. ECON. PERSP.
49 (Winter 1988); Jensen, Takeovers: Folklore and Science, HARV. Bus. REv. 109
(Nov.-Dec. 1984); Johnson, Antitakeover Legislation: Not Necessary, Not Wise, 35
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A less obvious "victim" resulting from placing restrictions on

insider trading is the brokerage industry. Because Canada, England,
and the United States are virtually the only countries that place
restrictions on insider trading,50 it is likely that the Canadian, British,
and U.S. brokerage industries will lose business to countries that do

not regulate insider trading or have minimal restrictions that are
enforced lightly. Business tends to flow where the barriers are lowest,

so brokerage business will flow out of the countries that erect the
highest barriers and into the countries that have the lowest.

Outlawing or restricting insider trading may have long-term adverse effects on the economy. The market certainly will operate less
efficiently because insider trading increases market efficiency.5 Hostile

takeovers will be more difficult to make, so shareholders will lose,

52
given that shareholders tend to benefit by hostile takeovers.
Insider trading laws result in compliance and escape costs. The
legal and accounting fees involved in complying with or circumventing
the law can be fairly expensive, an expense that would not be incurred

in the absence of insider trading laws. Using indirect means to
accomplish what could otherwise be accomplished directly also leads

to unnecessary costs.5 3 The delay in disclosure that results from using
indirect means of accomplishing the goal also increases market inef-

ficiency. There may also be other transaction costs, such as using an
obscure mutual fund or foreign bank or broker, when a more direct
purchase would be less costly.
Taxpayers are adversely affected by insider trading laws because
enormous resources must be placed at the disposal of the police power

ST. L. REV. 303 (1987); Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes,
73 VA. L. REV. 111 (1987); How Much Indiana's Anti-Takeover Law Cost Shareholders, Wall Street Journal, May 5, 1988, at 32, col. 3; Curbing Raiders is Bad for
Business, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1988, § 3, at 2, col. 2; The Real Boesky-Case Issue,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1986, at A-27, col. 1; D. Prychitko, Corporate Takeovers and
Shareholder Interests, IssuE ALERT No. 13 (Citizens for a Sound Economy, Washington, D.C., Apr. 16, 1987).
50. B. RIDER & L. FFRENCH, THE REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING (1979);
McMenamin, Witchhunt, 20 REASON 36 (1988). For a thorough discussion of the
Canadian rules, see PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, supra note 1, ch. 8.
51. Finnerty, Insiders and Market Efficiency, 31 J. FIN. 1141 (1976). F.H.
Buckley discusses this point. See PRINCIPLES AND POLICIS, supra note 1, at 680.
52. Jarell, Brickley & Netter, The Market for CorporateControl: The Empirical
Evidence Since 1980, J. ECON. PERSP. 49 (Winter 1988).
53. Manne, supra note 12; H. Demsetz, Perfect Competition, Regulation, and
the Stock Market, in EcoNomnc POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATION
SECURITIES (Manne ed. 1969).
CLEV.
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to do any kind of policing. The resources used to police the insider
trading laws might be better used to prevent some real criminal activity
from being committed. For any use of government resources, there is
a cost and a benefit. Because insider trading can be regarded as a
victimless crime,14 if indeed, it is a crime at all, an argument can be
made that the resources government uses to enforce the insider trading
laws can be better employed elsewhere.
E.

PROPERTY RIGHTS

Information can be an asset. Where the owner of an asset uses
that asset for gain, there should be no complaint, as long as there is
no fraud or coercion. But where such an asset is used for gain without
the owner's permission, any gain belongs to the owner.
Financial analysts generally obtain information about a company
by analyzing public information and interviewing company officials
who are often all too eager to provide whatever information is
requested. In such cases, it can hardly be said that the financial
analyst misappropriated information belonging to the company, and
there should be no prohibition on using the information for profit.
Such property is in the public domain and the company therefore has
relinquished whatever claim it once had. Whatever information a
financial analyst obtains in this manner is earned by considerable
effort, and he acquires a property right in that information which can
then be sold to clients, published in a newsletter to clients, or used
for personal gain." There is no ethical duty to give this property to
the world, just as there is no ethical duty to give any other property
to the world.16 The property can be kept for personal use or given to
any persons of the owner's choosing, either for profit or for free.
Forcing an analyst to give this information to the world before being
allowed to trade on it would eliminate the incentive to develop the
54. Manne, supra note 12 at 937.
55. Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility
to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PENN. L. REv. 798 (1973).
56. Bok might disagree with this statement, but Nozick would not. See S. BOK,
SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 136-52 (1982); R.
NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974). Nozick advocates an entitlement

theory of property rights; if you have acquired property legitimately, you are entitled

to it-period. Bok seems to say that you may no longer be entitled to a certain
amount of property if you have too much of it. Of course, with this view, the state
receives a sanction to confiscate the property if some bureaucrat or group of
bureaucrats determines it should be confiscated. Bok's view is based on the mistaken
belief that there can be some public interest that is somehow superior to a private
interest.
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information in the first place, and the market would suffer as a
result.57 Such coercive actions would also be unjust to the analyst
whose property rights are being impinged. 8
F.

CIVIL LIBERTIES ISSUES

There are also civil liberties issues. Enforcement and punishment

must necessarily be discretionary and discriminatory. 59 There are just

too many individuals who are violating the law to find and prosecute
57. Fama & Laffer, Information and Capital Markets, J. Bus. 289 (July 1971);
Ronen, The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on Information Generation and Disclosure by Corporations,52 AcCT. REV. 438 (1977).
58. Envy also plays a part in the prohibition against insider trading. Many
people resent it when they see others become wealthy with little (visible) effort, while
they are living from paycheck to paycheck. Demagogues are not above whipping up
and encouraging such sentiment. They would like to see inside traders punished or
deprived of their property, not because the property is an ill-gotten gain, but because
the inside traders were able to acquire it whereas the envious person was not. U.S.
Federal prosecutor Rudolph Giuliani even went so far as to brag that he not only
wanted to bring inside traders to justice but also wanted to destroy their reputation.
See McMenamin, Witchhunt, 20 REASON 39 (1988).
Timothy Tabor, Richard Wigton and Robert Freeman represent three cases on
point. Each of these respectable Wall Street arbitragers was arrested and charged
with insider trading. A few months later, the charges were dropped for lack of
evidence, but by that time their careers were destroyed. A cloud is still hanging over
their heads because the government has promised to indict them again although it
had no more evidence when it made the threat than it did when it indicted them
initially. See McMenamin, supra, at 34; see also Political Prosecutor, 310 THE
ECONOMIST, Jan. 14, 1989, at 72.
Envy is a vice that has existed since time immemorial. The Bible calls it one of
the seven capital sins. It is at the root of much legislation, such as the progressive
income tax and death taxes. See generally R. NoZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA

(1974); H.

(1966); R. SHEAFFER, RESENTMENT AGAINST ACHIEVEMENT:
THE ASSAULT UPON ABILITY (1988). It encompasses the idea that

SCHOECK, ENVY

UNDERSTANDING

people who have more property than you do should have it taken away from them.
The fact that they might have earned it only adds to the ill feeling, and the fact that
they might have earned it with little effort is worse yet.
Insider trading also engenders resentment. For a discussion of envy as applied
to insider trading, see Foley, "Insider Trading": The Moral Issue, 37 THE FREEMAN
409, 410 (1987). Inside traders can earn in a few weeks what it takes most people
several lifetimes to earn. They earn it with little visible effort. There is something
"shady" about how they earn it. The information is secret and they often obtain it
through a "good old boy" network. The perception that the inside trader's actions
were based on greed rather than altruism makes the act appear reprehensible, where
in fact it is just a modern example of Adam Smith's "Invisible Hand" at work. See
A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776).
59. Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. REv. 547,
554 (1970).
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them all. As is the case whenever a large number of people are
breaking the law, government power can be abused through selective
enforcement. Because the SEC does not have the resources to prosecute all violators, it may tend to prosecute those offenders who are
in the least favor with the prosecutor.
°
The SEC case against R. Foster Winans is a case in point.6 In
that case, a Wall Street Journalreporter traded on information that
he would later use in his column. He and some friends bought some
stock shortly before his column appeared in print and sold it shortly
thereafter. The information contained in his column caused the stock's
price to rise. The SEC claimed that his use of this information was a
violation of its Rule lOb-5. This case was seen as having a potential
chilling effect on the first amendment freedom of the press because
it was attempting to regulate a reporter's behavior. Even if Winans
was guilty of misappropriating his employer's property (the insider
information), there are adequate state remedies for such offenses. He
6
could be prosecuted for theft or misappropriation of property. ' There
is no need for the federal government to intrude into an area that has
traditionally been a state offense.
In the Dirks case, 62 a financial analyst used nonpublic information
to alert his clients that something was wrong at Equity Funding, and
he advised them to sell their stock. He blew the whistle after he
alerted his clients. Rather than being regarded as a hero for disclosing
information that led to the Equity Funding scandal, the analyst was
prosecuted by the government and he temporarily lost his right to
continue in his employment. In addition, he was forced to spend tens
of thousands of dollars in legal fees to defend himself against an
alleged crime that the United States Supreme Court eventually held
was no crime at all. 63 Prosecuting people such as Dirks for uncovering
and disclosing fraud places a chilling effect on the future actions of
all individuals. They will not "blow the whistle" if they fear being
prosecuted, and they will not expend the effort to discover information
60. United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd, 484 U.S.
(1987).
19
61. For a discussion of property rights in information and the misappropriation

theory, see Aldave, Misappropriation:A General Theory of Liability for Trading on

Nonpublic Information, 13 HOFSTRA L. REv. 101 (1984); Manne, supra note 12;

Martin, Insider Trading and the Misappropriation Theory: Has the Second Circuit
Gone Too Far?, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 78 (1986).
62. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). This case is discussed in PRINCIPLES
AND POLICIES, supra note 1, at 698.

63. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 665 ("Under the inside-trading and tipping rules set
forth above, we find that there was no actionable violation by Dirks.").
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if they fear that such information will result in punishment.
The free speech aspect of insider trading has been neglected. To
the extent the SEC prevents individuals from speaking, or threatens
to punish them for speaking, or tells them how to speak or what to
say, it places a chilling effect on the right of free speech. Wolfson
points out 64 that if Winans' failure to disclose his financial interest in
his column constituted a violation of the securities laws, then the only
way for Winans to avoid liability would be to disclose in his column
the financial interest he had acquired, or for the newspaper not to
run the article. In effect, the SEC would be dictating what he should
include in his story. If Winans could constitutionally be prosecuted
on the misappropriation theory, there is no limit to the extent to
which the government can intrude into all areas of communications.
It is not inconceivable that government could require a reporter
who covers a steel strike to reveal the fact that he owns steel company
stock. 65 However, it is more likely that the radio or television station
covering the story would suppress such information to avoid potential
liability or loss of its license. Such suppression was exactly what
happened when the United States Congress passed the Fairness Doctrine.66 Any such regulations have a chilling effect on the first amendment right to free speech and press, and on the public's right to
know. However, this chilling effect may not necessarily render regulation constitutionally impermissable. For example, government has
regulated commercial speech, and there is a body of case law to
support such regulation, 67 although many of these rulings seem to
violate the right of free speech.
The Investment Advisers Act of 194068 is a case in point. In one
recent case, Christopher Lowe, a registered investment adviser, was
prosecuted and convicted of violating this Act. 69 His registration was
64. Wolfson, Civil Liberties and Regulation of Insider Trading, in ECONOMIC
329-34 (J. Dorn and H. Manne eds. 1987).
65. Id. at 331.

LIBERTIES AND THE JUDICIARY,

66. See L. POWE, AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 10820 (1987).
67. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447

U.S. 557 (1980); McMenamin & Gorenc, Subverting the First Amendment,
23 (Jan. 1983).

REASON

68. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(c) (1988).

69. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181 (1985). This case has been discussed by several
commentators. One of the more recent discussions is Comment, The Right to a Free
Press and the Regulation of Securities Newsletters: The Controversy Continues, 56
U. CIN. L. REV. 1445 (1988). See also Aman, SEC v. Lowe: Professional Regulation
and the First Amendment, 1985 Sup. CT.

REV.

93; Coffhan, Lowe v. Securities and
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revoked, and he was prohibited from publishing his newsletter, even
though the SEC did not address the issue of whether anything he
published was false or misleading. Such prior restraint erodes an
individual's freedom of speech, even if the newsletter was technically
the product of a closely held corporation rather than an individual.
There is also an argument to be made that regulating stock
70
transfers can impinge on freedom of association. Stock certificates
represent a membership interest in an organization. Placing restrictions on buying and selling such membership interests and on communicating information between members constitutes a restriction of
the freedom of association.
Another threat, not just to civil liberties, but to major sectors of
the economy, is the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
law (RICO),7 which allows a federal prosecutor to freeze a company's
assets before it has been proved that a crime has been committed.
Punishment is inflicted before anyone has been found guilty of any
crime.
The most recent example, and perhaps the greatest abuse of this
law, is the Drexel Burnham case. 72 In this case, United States Attorney

Exchange Commission: The Deterioration of Financial Newsletter Regulation, 10
NOVA L.J. 1267 (1986); Desch, Lowe v. SEC: Guaranteeing the Right to Publish
Investment Newsletters Through Statutory Construction, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 577

(1986); Draughon, SEC v. Lowe: Redefining the Bona Fide Newspaper Exclusion,
14 SEC. REG. L.J. 291 (1987); Garver, Lowe v. SEC: The First Amendment Status
of Investment Advice Newsletter, 35 AM. U.L. REv. 1253 (1986); Gora, Supreme

Court Report: Five Wins and Nine Losses for Free Speech Fans, 71 A.B.A. J.116
(1985); Law, Regulation of Investment Newsletter Publishers: The SEC's Power
Reaches a New "Lowe," 11 VT. L. REV. 175 (1986); Lee, The Effects of Lowe on
the Application of the Investments Advisers Act of 1940 to Impersonal Investment
Advisory Publications, 42 Bus. LAW. 507 (1987); Levant, Financial Columnists as
Investment Advisers: After Lowe and Carpenter, 74 CAirs. L. REv. 2061 (1986);
Mohr, Lowe v. SEC: Avoidance of the Commercial Speech Definition-The Right
Result for the Wrong Reasons, 17 U. TOL. L. REv. 1007 (1986); Nites, The SEC's

Regulation of the Financial Press: The Legal Implications of the Misappropriation
Theory, 52 BROOKLYN L. REv. 43 (1986); Norquist, SEC v. Lowe: The Constitutionality of Prohibiting Publication of Investment Newsletters Under the Investment
Advisers Act, 69 MINN. L. REv. 937 (1985); Thompson, Lowe v. SEC: Investment

Advisers Act of 1940 Clashes with First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and
Press, 21 U. RICH. L. REv. 205 (1986).
70. Wolfson, supra note 64, at 334.
71. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
72. This case has been discussed in numerous articles in the financial and
popular press. See, e.g., The RICO Racket, THE EcoNOM sT, Dec. 17-24, 1988, at
14; Nailing the Junk Kings, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 2, 1989, at 44; What Hath Drexel
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Rudolph Giuliani threatened to freeze Drexel Burnham Lambert's
assets if it did not plead guilty to six felony counts and pay a $650
million fine for allegedly violating the insider trading laws. Had Drexel
decided to exercise its right to a trial, it could have been shut down
by Giuliani, because having the company's assets frozen is tantamount
to having it close its doors and go out of business. Now that Drexel
is a confessed felon (even though it may have committed no felony),
it is subject to a barrage of civil lawsuits. It stands to lose all its
federal, state, and local government business. In fact, it has since
sought protection under the bankruptcy laws. The Federal Savings
and Loan Insurance Corporation no longer allows Drexel to underwrite its junk bond issues. New York City and Wisconsin no longer
allow Drexel to participate in bond issues. There is a possibility that
no entity requiring state licensing will be able to do business with
Drexel."
RICO was originally intended to prevent racketeers from hiding
their assets between the time of indictment and conviction. While it
can be argued that even yet-to-be-convicted gangsters are entitled to
have their day in court before having their assets frozen, the case is
even more clear when the accused cannot reasonably be classified as
a racketeer and the accused stands to suffer substantial loss if assets
are frozen before trial. Drexel clearly is not a gangster in the traditional sense even if it was actually guilty of committing a crime (we
Wrought?, FORTUNE, Jan. 16, 1989, at 10. For more scholarly analyses of RICO, see
Barnett, The End of Court Imposed Limitations to Civil RICO-Sedima S.P.R.L.
v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985), 1986 AIZ. ST. L.J. 521 (1986); Bridges,
Private RICO Litigation Based Upon "Fraud in the Sale of Securities," 18 GA. L.
REv. 43 (1983); Bridwell & Cooper, Hard Law and Bad Cases: The Fourth Circuit
Limits Civil RICO, 22 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 715 (1987); Driscoll, United States v.
Sutton: Reining in on Runaway RICO, 42 U. PITT. L. REv. 131 (1980); Goldsmith

& Keith, Civil RICO Abuse: The Allegations in Context, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv. 55;
Gorenc, United States v. Sutton: The Sixth Circuit Curbs Abuse of RICO, the Federal
Racketeering Enterprise Statute, 28 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 629 (1979); Helger, Criminal
Forfeitureand the Necessity for a Post-SeizureHearing: Are CCE and RICO Rackets
for the Government?, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 776 (1983); Hettinger, Due Process in
PreliminaryProceedings Under RICO and CCE, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 2068 (1983);

Jennette, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees Under RICO: An Affront to a Defendant's
Right to Counsel and to a Fair Trial, 12 U. DAYTON L. REv. 553 (1987); Stallings,
CriminalLaw-Are Governmental Entities AppropriateRICO Enterprises?, 13 MEM.

ST. U.L. REv. 96 (1982); Valukas & Walsh, Forfeitures: When Uncle Sam Says You
Can't Take It With You, 14 LITIGATION No. 2 31 (1988); Warren, RICO Forfeitures

and the Rights of Innocent Third Parties, 18 CALIF. L. REv. 345 (1982).
73. Drexel Burnham Lambert: Unfinished Business, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 14,
1989, at 72.
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will never know, because the case will never get to court). It is not

about to hide its assets to protect them from seizure. The RICO law
gives prosecutors a weapon that no one should have-the power to

cause an accused substantial harm before trial. In the Drexel case,

in the financial sense, if it
the accused was threatened with death,
74

exercised its right to its day in court.
The SEC's attack on Drexel stands to have more far-reaching
consequences than just a financially weaker Drexel Burnham Lambert.

Clobbering Drexel with RICO stands to weaken the U.S. economy

and make it less competitive internationally, which hurts consumers
everywhere.
II.

OTHER REMARKS

To say that insider trading has a bad press and is commonly held
in ill repute would be the understatement of the century. Dennis B.

Levine, a thirty-three year old New York City investment banker, was
recently indicted on charges of insider trading. 7 He is accused of
74. A number of commentators have pointed out the possibility of abuse of
this statute. See, e.g., Bridges, Private RICO-Litigation Based Upon "Fraud in the
Sale of Securities," 18 GA. L. REv. 43 (1983); Bridwell & Cooper, Hard Law and
Bad Cases: The Fourth Circuit Limits Civil RICO, 22 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 715
(1987); Dombrink & Meeker, Racketeering Prosecution: The Use and Abuse of
RICO, 16 RUTGERS L.J. 633 (1985); Goldsmith & Keith, Civil RICO Abuse: The
Allegations in Context, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 55; Lacovara & Aronow, The Legal
Shakedown of Legitimate Business People: The Runaway Provisions of Private Civil
RICO, 21 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1 (1985); Valukas and Walsh, Forfeitures: When Uncle
Sam Says You Can't Take It With You, 14 LITIGATION No. 2, 31 (1988); Note, The
End of Court Imposed Limitations to Civil RICO-Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,
105 S.Ct. 3275 (1985), 1986 ARm. ST. L.J. 521; Comment, RICO Forfeituresand
the Rights of Innocent Third Parties, 18 CAL. W.L. REv. 345 (1982); Note, United
States v. Sutton: The Sixth Circuit Curbs Abuse of RICO, the FederalRacketeering
Enterprise Statute, 28 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 629 (1979); Note, Due Process in Preliminary Proceedings Under RICO and CCE, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 2068 (1983); Comment,
Forfeiture of Attorney's Fees Under RICO: An Affront to a Defendant's Right to
Counsel and to a Fair Trial, 12 U. DAYTON L. REV. 553 (1987); Note, United States
v. Sutton: Reining in on Runaway RICO, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 131 (1980); Gutis,
Judge Dismisses Racketeering Case Over LILCO Rates: Sees Misuse of RICO Law,
The New York Times, Feb. 12, 1989, at IL, col. 3.
75. For more on the Dennis B. Levine case and other such cases in the popular
press, see D. FRANTZ, LEVINE & CO.: WALL STREET'S INSIDER TRADING SCANDAL
(1987); Castro, Of Loose Lips and Stock Tips: Victory in the Winans Case Will Help
in Snaring Insider Traders, TIME, Nov. 30, 1987, at 63; Insider Jail, THE ECONOMIST,
Oct. 10, 1987, at 93; Teachout, Inside Dennis Levine, FORTUNE, Sept. 28, 1987, at
195; The Inside Traders Twisting in the Wind, BUSINESS WEEK, Aug. 24, 1987, at
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earning $12.6 million on fifty-four separate deals in which he unlawfully utilized information not publicly disclosed. If convicted, he
could have been fined severely and been forced to spend twenty years
in prison. Indeed, as part of his plea bargain, he was made to
apologize for his conduct, compelled to give up a Bahamian bank
account of $10.6 million, plus over $1 million in other assets, and
shall now have to implicate others for the same "crime." His prosecutor, Rudolph Giuliani, has been highly praised for taking these
actions.
Practically all the articles that have been written on insider trading
in recent years have treated it as something evil. 6 Whenever the term
94; Weiss, Power & Crock, Insider Trading: Business as Usual, BUSINESS WEEK Aug.
24, 1987, at 20; Tell, Making Punishment Fit White-Collar Crime, BUSINESS WEEK,
June 15, 1987, at 84; Elias, Fast Moves by the Insiders Turn Wall Street Inside Out,
INSIGHT, Mar. 23, 1987, at 12; England, Scandal's Lessons Hit the Street, INSIGHT,
Mar. 23, 1987, at 8; Muck, The Boesky Touch, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Mar. 6, 1987,
at 14; Koepp, From Pinstripes to Prison Stripes, TIME, Mar. 2, 1987, at 48; Baer,
Handcuffs on Wall Street, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 23, 1987, at 38;
Levine Receives Prison Term, $362,000 Fine, Wall Street Journal, Feb. 23, 1987, at
2, col. 2; Now Wall Street Itself is on Trial, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 21, 1987, at 77;
Sight of Marshals and Handcuffs Stun Workers at Kidder, Goldman, Wall Street
Journal, Feb. 13, 1987, at 10, col. 5; Stewart & Hertzberg, Inside-Trading Scandal
Implicates High Aide At Goldman, Kidder, Wall Street Journal, Feb. 13, 1987, at 1,
col. 6; Dennis Levine: Where the Scam Faltered, FORTUNE, Jan. 5, 1987, at 49;
Kinkead, Ivan Boesky: Crook of the Year, FORTUNE, Jan. 5, 1987, at 48; Glaberson,
Laderman, Power & Cahan, Who'll Be the Next to Fall?, BUSINESS WEEK, Dec. 1,
1986, at 28; Spreading Scandal: Fall of Ivan Boesky Leads to Broader Probe of
Insider Information, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 17, 1986, at 1, col. 6.
76. The notable exception is the work of Henry G. Manne. See MANNE,
ECONOMC POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES (1969); MANNE,
INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966); Manne, Insider Trading and
Property Rights in New Information, 4 CATO J. 933 (1985), reprinted in ECONOMIC
LIBERTIES AND THE JUDICIARY, 317 (Dorn & Manne eds. 1987); Manne, Insider
Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV. 547 (1970); Manne, A Rejoinder
to Mr. Ferber, 23 VAND. L. REV. 627 (1970); Manne, Should Fund Managers Use
Inside Information Personally?, 1 THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR 19 (May 1967);
Manne, What's So Bad About Insider Trading?, 15 CHALLENGE 14 (Jan./Feb. 1967);
Manne, Insider Trading and the Administrative Process, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 473
(1967); Manne, In Defense of Insider Trading, HARV. BUS. REV. 113 (Nov./Dec.
1966); Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market (JSD dissertation, Yale University, 1966). For two particularly hostile and vociferous attacks on Manne's position,
see Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the
Stock Market, 53 VIRG. L. REV. 1425 (1967); Hetherington, Insider Trading and the
Logic of the Law, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 720.
Recently, other commentators have come to the defense of insider trading. See
Corcoran, Insider Trading Curbs Hurt Market Efficiency, The Financial Post, Feb.
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"insider trading" is used, the average listener/reader immediately
classifies it as a bad practice, or something that is immoral or
unethical. Insider traders are viewed as common criminals. 77 The
purpose of this article is to explore the nature of insider trading and
analyze the issues to determine the positive and negative aspects of
insider trading, and how policy should be changed, if at all.
Despite the foregoing, we maintain that those who engage in
insider trading, such as Dennis B. Levine, should not be held to be
in violation of the law; that those who prosecute them, on the other
hand, should be deemed guilty of initiating violence against people
who have not resorted to such uncivilized behavior (violence or fraud)
in the first place. Further, we contend that the inside trader, or
insider, provides benefits to society as a whole and that insider trading
activities should not be punished unless there has been fraud, a breach
of fiduciary duty or an illegal taking of property.
Before we can reach this conclusion, however, we must consider,
and reject, a spate of objections that have been levelled against the
insider. It is to this task that we now turn.
OBJECTION NO. 1: The inside tradertakes advantageof a position
of superiorknowledge. To be sure, this charge is accurate. The insider
does indeed utilize his own expert information sources in order to
benefit himself. But what is wrong with that? No less could be said
for every entrepreneur, trader, merchant, businessman, storekeeper,
capitalist, executive, industrialist, dealer, financier, banker, retailer,
wholesaler, and factor who ever engaged in commerce for profit. And
the same holds true for those professions where the main stock in
trade is expert knowledge, opinion or information. This would include
such callings as teacher, doctor, lawyer, professor, scientist, researcher, detective, librarian, and so forth. All these occupations use
expert knowledge or information.
And in what light are we to consider the lowly employee who
quits his modestly paying job so that he can "take advantage" of a
better offer down the street? We may assume that he hears about this
opportunity from his wife, or brother-in-law or baseball teammate,
8, 1989, at 9 (Toronto, Ont.); Corcoran, Insider Trading Not a Criminal Activity,
The Financial Post, Feb. 7, 1989, at 11 (Toronto, Ont.); Lawson, The Ethics of
Insider Trading, I I HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 727 (1988); Macey, Ethics, Economics,
and Insider Trading: Ayn Rand Meets the Theory of the Firm, 11 HARv. J.L. &
PUB. PoL'Y 785 (1988); Cox, What's So Bad About Insider Trading?, THE PLAIN
DEALER, Dec. 12, 1988, at B-5, col. 1 (Cleveland, Ohio).
77. McMenamin, Witchhunt, 20 REASON 34 (1988).
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or in any other "privileged way," not open on an equal basis to all
others. Surely, he does so on the basis of superior information than
that possessed by his fellow workers. Otherwise, they would have all
quit, presumably, to attain the higher salary. Shall we incarcerate
such a person along with the inside trader, who also "takes advantage
of a position of superior knowledge"? Similarly, if we are to punish
inside stock market traders, what about others who engage in commercial activities? Does this apply to the housewife who hears from
her hairdresser, who was told by her sister, the stock clerk at a
department store, that a bargain sale was soon to be put into effect?
If this housewife rushes down to the supermarket, should she be met
by the economics police?
There is no rhyme or reason to this law, or any limitation on its
application. It can, with equal logic, be applied to the child's sidewalk
lemonade stand; to the customer who "improperly" ferrets out a
bargain price; to the supplier, who "illegitimately" learns of their
great demand for lemons, and holds out for a higher price.
Obviously, the law would never be applied in such contrived
cases. Those who attempted to do so would only succeed in making
themselves into laughingstocks. But this should not be allowed to
disguise Hayek's insight about being governed by objective law, not
arbitrary man-made whims.7"
OBJECTION NO. 2: Insider trading is unfair to the small investor
who lacks these special informationaladvantages; the playing field is
not level for the small investor.79 There are serious deficiencies with
this objection as well. First of all, the analogy between sports events
sand stock market investment is not a valid one. The former is a zero
sum game-one team or player must win, the other must lose. 0 The
latter is a positive sum game, where both parties to a voluntary trade
must gain. They do so at least in the expectations sense, for neither
would have agreed to an exchange (of money for shares, or shares
for money) if he did not expect to thereby benefit himself. Thus,
there is a strong case for a level playing field in athletic encounters.8 '
78. F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960).
79. Procrustes, in Greek mythology, was an early exponent of the level playing
field (enforced equality) theory. If his house guest was too long to fit in his bed,
Procrustes would cut off some body parts until his guest fit. If the guest was too
short, Procrustes would put the guest on the rack until he stretched to fit. For a
modern view of enforced equality, see A. FLEW, THE POLITICS OF PROCRUSTES (1981).
80. Unless, of course, there is a tie.
81. Although even here, there are times when, by mutual consent, the playing
field can be tilted one way or another, to give an advantage, or handicap, to the
weaker side.
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Otherwise, sports fans will not be able to unambiguously credit the
winning team with the victory. Only an even playing field, or one in
which goals are switched at half time, can match the skills of the
contending sides; and this, after all, is the whole point of the exercise.
There may conceivably be reasons for employing similar equalizing
techniques in the stock market, but the argument from sports will
hardly be sufficient to establish them.
Second, it is by no means unfair that stock market information
is not equated over all participants. Consider another analogy, this
time a better one, from the field of innovations. It is patently obvious
that the knowledge of all would-be inventors is highly heterogeneous.
That is, information varies all the way from that possessed by scientific
research institutes, with all of the latest technology and hundreds of
credentialed scientists, down to that held by the basement or garage
tinkerer. If it is "unfair" that stock market investors have widely
disparate stores of information, is it also "unfair" that this same
situation applies also to inventors?
Maybe it is unfair, but if it is, this applies equally to both stock
market transactors and inventors. In any event, it is exceedingly hard
to determine whether or not it is unfair because we are never vouchsafed any independent criterion upon which such a judgment could
be rendered.
From where did this fetish for equal information spring? Its
source would appear to be the contention that it is somewhere
engraved on stone tablets that the small investor has the right to
knowledge that is equal to that possessed by anyone else. But how
could such a grotesque idea gain any sort of currency at all, let alone
enough to support the incarceration of inside traders, just because
their information is patently superior to that of most other people?
Although this is a highly speculative conjecture, one possible
explanation is that this view is an implication, or an extension, of one
of the tenets of the "perfectly competitive" model. This tenet, of
course, is the proscription that in order for competitive conditions to
hold, there must be full information made available to all market
participants. Under perfect competition, knowledge is costless and
immediately available to all. Ipso facto, information must be equal.
Because everyone is assumed omniscient, everyone must be equally
well informed. It may well be viewed as improbable that the critics
of inside traders should be enthralled by a theory as unrealistic as
that of the perfectly competitive model,8 2 but this scenario does have
82. For an exegesis of perfect competition, with its emphasis on full, equal,
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a sort of perverse appeal to it.3
Another possible explanation is that it stems from the move
toward equality favored by certain intellectuals. If we are to "share
the wealth," and penalize those who have more of something than
the average person, why not equalize information as well? States
Terence Corcoran in this regard, "[N]ormal, natural, logical behavior
that adds to market efficiency ... is considered immoral under the
'8 4
egalitarian stock market theory which makes inequality a crime."
OBJECTION NO. 3: Insider trading hurts outsiders-those who
cannot call upon privileged information in their portfolio choices.
This is not a decisive argument for prohibiting the practice, for even
if it does reduce the incomes of other people, there is no legitimate
presumption that all economically competitive behavior that is harmand indeed, perfect information, see E.H. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (1933, 1948); J.M. CLARK, COMPETITION AS A DYNAMIC PROCESS
(1961); Slichter, In Defense of Bigness in Business, in MONOPOLY POWER AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: THE PROBLEM OF INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION 13 (E.
Mansfield ed. 1968); Galbraith, The Economics of Technical Development, in MoNOPOLY POWER AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: THE PROBLEM OF INDUSTRIAL CONCEN-

TRATION 36 (E. Mansfield ed. 1968); J. ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT
COMPETITION (1965); J.M. CLARK, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30
Am. ECON. REv. 241 (1940). Many textbooks teach this rather peculiar doctrine. See,
e.g., P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS (various eds.). For a critique of this doctrine, see I.
KIRZNER, COMPETITION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP (1973); M. ROTHBARD, MAN, ECON-

OMY AND STATE

(1962).

83. The perfectly competitive model theory has been outmoded for years, yet
politicians and others in the present generation continue to speak of it as if it were
gospel. This inability to shake off outmoded theories reminds one of what John
Maynard Keynes said at page 383 of his The General Theory of Employment, Interest

and Money (1936):

The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right
and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood.
Indeed, the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves
to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves
of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the
air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years
back. I am sure that the power of vested interest is vastly exaggerated
compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas. Not, indeed, immediately,
buf after a certain interval; for in the field of economic and political
philosophy there are not many who are influenced by new theories after
they are twenty-five or thirty years of age, so that the ideas which civil
servants and politicians and even agitators apply to current events are not
likely to be the newest. But, soon or late, it is ideas, not vested interests,
which are dangerous for good or evil.

84. R. Corcoran, Insider Trading Curbs Hurt Market Efficiency, The Financial
Post, Feb. 8, 1989, at 9 (Toronto, Ont.).
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ful must be outlawed. For example, if A opens up a grocery store
across the street from B's store and attracts some of B's customers
away, A may be said to hurt B. And yet B has no right against A
that he should not be victimized by harm in this way. If A marries
the woman that B was courting, the welfare of B is again reduced.
But there certainly can be no just law against competition in the
marriage market that would disallow such conduct.
Anyone who buys (or sells) anything can, in similar manner, be
understood to be harming other purchasers (vendors). For this activity
raises (decreases) prices above (below) the level that would have
otherwise obtained. And at higher (lower) prices, the economic welfare
of all other demanders (suppliers) will be diminished. So even if it
could be shown that the inside trader disadvantages outsiders, this
would not justify forbidding the endeavor.
However, there is no evidence for this contention either. True,
there may be stock market participants who purchased shares at
elevated prices (or sold at deflated prices) because they were in
ignorance of bad (good) information known only to the insider. But
surely there will be outsiders who earn additional profits by holding
onto shares made more valuable through the actions of insiders based
on positive information. As well, there will be nonowners who prosper
by holding off buying while prices plummet because of the machinations of inside traders acting on negative information. It is impossible
to determine whether the gainers will outnumber the losers. And it is
completely irrelevant, because, even if the latter predominate over the
former, we still have no argument for prohibiting insider trading.
The point is that we have a right that no one initiate violence
against our persons or property, but not that no one hurt our
economic (or other) interests. Our title over goods confers ownership
only over the goods themselves, in their physical manifestations. We
have no rights concerning the value of our property, for this is
determined by all actual or potential market participants. In this
sense, inside trading is a "victimless" crime. Just as in the case of
pornography, or gambling, or prostitution, there will be third parties
who will claim ill effects. But there will not be, there cannot be, other
people whose rights have been violated by the insider.
OBJECTION NO. 4: Inside trading increases the volatility of stock
price oscillations; this renders the market too hazardous for most
people to enter, as they fear they will not have an equal chance to
earn profits; this undermines the capitalist order.85 There are numerous
85. Buckley discusses this argument. See F.H.

supra note 1, at 705.

BUCKLEY AND

M.Q.

CONNELLY,

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10

and grave shortcomings to this objection as well. First of all, even
assuming that insider activity will raise price variance, and that this
will indeed deter small traders from investing on Wall Street, the
capitalist system will by no means be undermined. For, contrary to
those who urge widespread stock ownership as a means of attaining
the free marketplace, 6 the two are far from equivalent. If we assume
that the necessary and sufficient conditions of free enterprise are a
clearly defined set of private property rights (based on self ownership
and homesteading) and a system of law that prohibits only the
initiation of violence against nonaggressors s7 then the ban on insiders
can hardly safeguard laissez-faire capitalism. On the contrary, because
this sort of commercial behavior certainly initiates violence against no
one, outlawing it is clearly contrary to the ethic of the marketplace.
The analogy between information of stock values and knowledge that
enhances inventions is again apropos. It makes as much sense to
assert that capitalism depends on investors thinking they have an
equal chance to profit from stock market speculation as it does to
claim this system depends upon tinkerers supposing that they have an
equal chance to discover a new technological innovation. Namely, it
makes no sense at all. It is a peculiar and idiosyncratic definition that
equates free enterprise with such egalitarianism. It is possible to have
a healthy and vibrant marketplace even though individuals do not
possess equal intellectual capacities and identical information.
Further, there is a contradiction implicit in this criticism of the
insider. If it were true, then no small investors would dare to tread
in so dangerous a venue as the stock market. But the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 was passed to protect the owner of just a few
shares. 8" If this objection were correct, there could have been no one
86. See L. KELSO, THE CAPITALIST MANIFESTO (1958). For a critique of this
doctrine, see T.P. Roth, The Economics of Property Rights Transferral, in PRIVATIZATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE (M. Walker ed. 1980).
87. This view on the role of the state has an honored and noble tradition,
going back to Adam Smith, John Locke, Thomas Jefferson and a number of other
classical liberals and libertarians. However, a detailed exploration of this view would
take too much space. For a modern exposition of this philosophy, see R. NozIcK,
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974); M. ROTHBARD, THE ETHICS OF LMERTY (1982);
M. ROTHBARD, FOR A NEW LEBERTY (1973).
88. The securities acts of 1933 and 1934 were enacted to restore public confidence in the securities markets after the 1929 stock market crash. The Securities Act
of 1933 requires companies to make certain detailed disclosures before offering
securities for sale in interstate commerce. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
addresses the secondary distribution of securities as well as proxies, tender offers,
insiders and the regulation broker-dealers. For a good, brief description of these acts,
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for the SEC Act to have defended at that time! Because it is obvious
that small investors were participating in the market then, it could
not possibly be true that the extreme price oscillations "caused" by
the insiders would be sufficient to discourage all those of moderate
means who desire to invest.
So far in this analysis, we have been assuming that the insider
does indeed destabilize the stock market. It is now time to call into
question this assumption; i.e., the major premise of the argument we
have been considering must be rejected. Far from increasing volatility,
it can be shown that insider trading actually reduces it. This somewhat
startling insight is directly deducible from the fact that the insider
knows more about the true value of the corporation in question than
anyone else. Given a profit orientation, the more information available
in a market, the sooner, and the more likely, prices are to approach
their long run equilibrium prices.
It is for this reason that prices are higher, and vary more, in
towns where tourists are the preponderant customers, 9 than in places
where long-residing citizens are the main purchasers. Travellers have
far less incentive to make themselves expert in local markets than do
the regular inhabitants. They cannot call upon any stores of information, and the payoff from any knowledge they manage to attain
will only last for the short time they reside in the neighborhood. A
merchant who charges a tourist a price far in excess of what is being
offered elsewhere has a good chance of having it accepted. But it is
painfully obvious that such a ploy could not be pulled on a resident.
It would be rejected outright and resented, resulting in loss of good
will for the vendor.
The more accurate information that underlies the concatenation
of prices, the more efficient they are likely to be, and the better will
be the allocation of resources that depend on them. Moreover, a
market is far less likely to become "blindsided" to the degree it is
based on the best possible knowledge available. Because this is precisely the sort of information said to be possessed by the insider, it
follows that allowing full scope for his participation in the stock
market is the last best hope for a stable price system, with minimal
price volatility.
see J. FRASCONA, C.P.A. LAW REVIEW 865 (1977); G. LowE, C.P.A. Bus LAW
REVIEw 100 (1978). Most business law texts also cover these acts. For a history of
the Securities and Exchange Commission, see R. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION VERSUS CORPORATE AMERICA (1982).

89. G. BECKER,

HUMAN CAPITAL, 51-52 (1964).
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OBJECTION NO. 5: The inside trader violates his fiduciary responsibilities; he commits fraud, which is equivalent to theft. It is of
course illegal, and should be so, to contravene one's fiduciary duties,
for example, those that exist between an executor of an estate and a
minor beneficiary. The administrator in such a situation has voluntarily taken upon himself certain obligations, and failure to deal with
his ward in an arm's length manner not only breaches this commitment, but sets up insoluble conflicts of interest as well.
Fiduciary responsibilities, however, do not exist in a vacuum.
They do not pertain to all businesspersons, but only to those who
have voluntarily taken them upon themselves. And it is simply not
true that the inside trader, merely by virtue of this status, has
shouldered any obligations of this sort that do not pertain to us all.
It would be the rare stock market deal indeed where the insider
happened to be related in this manner to the relevant outsider. And
even if such a rare occurrence did come to pass, it could hardly be
considered a violation of fiduciary responsibilities; rather, it would
be deemed as the merest of coincidence.
It is of course true that fraud is equivalent to theft. But in the
perpetration of this crime, the seller must lie about the product or
deceive the buyer in some manner. The stock market, however, is
extremely impersonal. The inside trader merely authorizes his stockbroker to offer certain shares for sale, and this tender is made to all
market participants on an equal footing. Under such conditions, is it
possible for one party to the transaction to falsify information to the
other? At the time of the offer, the insider does not even know who
will agree to acquire his property. Nor can he properly be said to be
conveying lies or misinformation to all potential market actors, for
he communicates no knowledge of any sort to anyone. He merely
orders his broker to sell.
OBJECTION NO. 6: It is unfair for an executive employee to receive
more compensation from his corporation than is called for in his
salary package, but one can earn far in excess of one's contracted
stipend by engaging in trading as an insider; therefore, this is a way
of cheating one's employer. In response to this objection, notice first
that no resort is here made to "the public interest." 9 Rather, the

90. It is a well-established principle of Anglo-American law that some contracts
are void because they are against the "public interest" or "public policy." Terms
like "public interest" or "public policy" would lead us to believe that public interests
are somehow different from private interests. But the public interest is really just the
sum of private interests. And since private interests are often in conflict with each

1989:1]

INSIDER TRADING

alleged victim is the insider's employer. This is a rather limited attack
on the practice we are considering, focusing on employees of affected
companies alone. Employee status, of course, is by no means a
necessary condition for inside trading. Others can do it too: employers, free lance journalists, geologists, etc. 91The objection concentrates
only on the former, implicitly conceding that the latter are blameless.

A second difficulty is that, even if the charge is true, it is not a

criticism of inside trading per se, but against the breaking of an

employment contract. Because there is already case law dealing with
violations of business agreements, 92 there would appear to be no

other, "public interest" is really just a meaningless term, "an example of the fallacy
of conceptual realism," as Rothbard points out. M. ROTHBARD, POWER AND MARKET
218, n.34 (1970). John Hospers has a similar view of the term "public interest."
People speak of 'the public interest.' But what is the public interest? Strictly
speaking, there is no such thing. There is only the interest of each individual
human being. There are interests that many or all people share, but these
are still the interests of individuals. When politicians say that something is
'to the public interest,' they usually mean that it serves the interests of some
people but goes against the interests of others-and usually the interests of
the people with the most political pull win out. Is it to the public interest
for some to be forced to die so that others may be saved? Is it to the public
interest for a hundred crazed men to lynch one man in the public square?
Is it to the public interest for all the citizens of the nation to be taxed to
pay for a federal dam in one section of it? In Sweden it takes a couple eight
to ten years on the average before they can obtain an apartment of their
own (owned by the government, rented by them); but they are not supposed
to complain, because 'it's in the public interest.' Just as there are only
individual rights, so there are only individual interests.
J. HOSPERS, LIBERTARIANISM 84 (1971).
"Social justice" is another meaningless term, as F.A. Hayek points out. See 2
F.
F.

HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE

(1976);

HAYEK NEW STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND THE HISTORY OF

57-68 (1978); THE ESSENCE OF HAYEK 62-100 (C. Nishiyama & K. Leube eds.
1984). The term "social" has also been bent out of shape over the years, to the point
where it has become meaningless, if not deceptive. See F. HAYEK, STUDIES IN
IDEAS

PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS 237-47 (1967). For a discussion of Hayek's
view of these terms, see C. Hoy, A PHILOSOPHY OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM: THE
POLITICAL THOUGHT OF F.A. HAYEK 47-56 (1984); G. WALKER, THE ETHICS OF F.A.

HAYEK (1986).
91. Yes, even geologists can engage in insider trading. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas

Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
This case is discussed in many places. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, supra note
1, at 682. As Buckley points out at 665, the "abstain or disclose rule" is largely
traceable to the Texas Gulf Sulphur case. According to this rule, insiders must either
abstain from trading on the insider information or disclose the information to the
investing public.
92. The rich common law tradition provides thousands of examples.
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reason to change present law in any way. Certainly, this objection
provides no evidence in support of the contention that legislation with
regard to inside trading is somehow remiss.
But the most basic problem is that inside trading does not
necessarily run counter to all employment contracts. If there is a
provision in the agreement that prohibits a broker-employee from
trading on his own account, well and good; the insider presumably
should be punished-but not because of insider trading-because of
contract violation. Not all companies, however, forbid this practice.
Some may welcome it, perhaps on the ground that it will reduce the
salary that would otherwise be needed to attract the employee. 93
OBJECTION NO. 7: Inside trading is an offense in the moral sense.
This may well be so, but it is irrelevant to the question we are
presently addressing. The idea that not all that is immoral should be
illegal goes back to the ancient Greeks, at least. Our only goal is to
determine if inside trading should be proscribed by law and its
practitioners subjected to fines and/or jail sentences. Surely it would
not be seriously argued that all activities that offend the moral sense
should be exposed to the penalties of the law. But, unless this view is
taken and defended, it does not logically follow that just because (or
even if) the behavior of the insider is an affront to morality, he
should be made to suffer legal sanctions. Furthermore, although an
analysis of morality would take us far beyond our present interests,
it may not be out of place to note that inside trading is not an
infringement on everyone's moral sense. That is, there are numerous
ethical viewpoints that are not at all antithetical to capitalist acts
between consenting adults 94-such as inside trading.

III. A BAD LAW THAT SHOULD BE REPEALED
The U.S. Congress recently passed the Insider Trading and
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988. 95 Yet the evidence so far
93. Henry G. Manne discusses this point in several places. See H. MANNE,
AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966); see also PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES,
supra note 1, at 711. Buckley mentions the deluge of commentary and criticism this
book has caused.
94. This felicitous phrase was coined by Robert Nozick. See R. NOZICK,
ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974). For more on the moral aspects of insider
trading, see R. Foley, Jr., Insider Trading: The Moral Issue, 37 THE FREEMAN 409
(1987).
95. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub.L.No.
100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988). For a summary of the Act's provisions, see Congress
INSIDER TRaINo
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uncovered strongly suggests that insider trading helps the market act
more efficiently while not violating the rights of any identifiable
individual or group. The likely result of this legislation will be a
market that operates less efficiently.
The law states that:
The Congress finds that (1) the rules and regulations of the Securities Exchange
Commission under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 governing trading while in possession of material, nonpublic
information are, as required by such Act, necessary and
appropriate in the public interest and for the protections of
investors;.
(2) the Commission has, within the limits of accepted
administrative and judicial construction of such rules and
regulations, enforced such rules and regulations vigorously,
effectively, and fairly; and
(3) nonetheless, additional methods are appropriate to
96
deter and prosecute violations of such rules and regulations.
The penalties for violating the Act are difficult to determine. For
example, "'profit gained' or 'loss avoided' is the difference between
the purchase or sale price of the security and the value of that security
as measured by the trading price of the security a reasonable period
97
after public dissemination of the nonpublic information." Such open
wording makes the penalty too indefinite. "Public dissemination"
may occur over a period of weeks, months, or even years, depending
on how some court chooses to interpret the statute's wording.
The strongest criticism that has been leveled against this new
9
legislation is that the term "insider trading" was not defined. That
Passes Greater Penalties And Detection on Insider Trading, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22,

1988, at 1, col. 1. For a more detailed account, see generally FED. SEc. L. REP. No.
1304, Part II (CCH Sept. 21, 1988). Criminal penalties include jail terms of up to 10
years and fines for individuals of up to $1 million ($2.5 million for non-natural
persons). The law gives the SEC the authority to pay bounties to individuals who
reveal insider trading violations. It also provides a private right of action, which
allows suits to be brought by alleged victims (even though they might not have been
harmed) against inside traders and tipsters just because they traded in the same class
of securities at approximately the same time as the inside trader.
96. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-704, § 2, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988).
97. Id. § 3(f).
98. The 1988 law is not the first legislation that has been passed to prohibit
insider trading. The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98
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omission was deliberate, perhaps because Congress could not clearly
define what insider trading is.9 The result of this serious omission
will be an increase in litigation because the courts are left to form
their own definition of the "crime." The "crime" of insider trading
is so vague that practically any investor could be found guilty of it.1oo
To charge Congress and other such legislative bodies with irresponsibility for this omission is an understatement. 10' Insider trading is
officially a crime, yet nobody knows how to define the crime. Many
legitimate transactions will not be made for fear of running afoul of
Stat. 1264 (1984), also provided penalties, including treble damages. See 15 U.S.C.
§§ 21, 78 (1988). For a discussion of the 1984 Act, and punishment for insider
trading in general, see Huss & Leete, Insider Trading Regulations: A Comparison of
Judicial and Statutory Sanctions, 25 AM. Bus. L.J. 301 (1987); Janvey, Criminal
Prosecution of Insider Trading, 15 SEC. REG. L. J. 136 (1987); Note, Treble Damages,
Deterrence, and Their Relation to Substantive Law: Ramifications of the Insider
Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, 20 VAL. U.L. REV. 575 (1986); see also PRINCIPLES
AND POLICIES, supra note 1, at 659, stating the Canadian definition of insider as
follows:
Insiders were defined in the 1966 Ontario legislation to include directors,
,senior officers,' holders of more than 10%70 of the voting
shares of the
corporation, and directors and senior officers of corporations that are
themselves insiders (that is, more than 10076 owners) of the corporation in
question. The addition of 'associates' to the civil liability provision caught
an individual's immediate family, partners, controlled corporations and
family trusts. The term 'affiliates' caught corporations controlling, controlled by or under common control with a corporate insider. For civil
liability purposes the CBCA defined insider more inclusively than did the
1966 Ontario Securities Act. In addition to those included in the provincial
legislation, the following are insiders under CBCA s. 125(1): the corporate
issuer of the securities traded; all of its employees and persons 'retained' by
it; and, most significantly, any person who receives confidential information
from an insider and who knows his mediate or immediate source to be an
insider. Members of this last group are called 'tippees.' While associates
and affiliates of insiders are not specifically brought within CBCA (section)
125(1), if in possession of material undisclosed information they might be
caught as 'tippers.'
In the 1978 OSA, the definition of insider was expanded to embrace
those who engaged or who proposed to engage in any business or professional activities with the issuer, a category which included some but not all
tippees. However, 1987 amendments to the OSA extended the statute's reach
to nearly all tippees. OSA §§ 75(5), 131(7).
99. Many attempts have been made by others at a definition. See generally, 39
ALA. L. REV. 337, 337-558 (1988) (Symposium: Defining "Insider Trading").
100. J.M. Cox, What's So Bad About Insider Trading?, The Plain Dealer, Dec.
12, 1988, at B-5, col. 1 (Cleveland, Ohio).
101. Justice Frankfurter would agree with this assessment. See Hunt for Laws'
'True' Meaning Subverts Justice, Wall Street Journal, Jan. 31, 1989, at 18, col. 3.
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the new insider trading laws, and it is likely that the market will react
negatively. It is not unforeseeable that dozens, or even hundreds, of
individuals and brokerage firms will face prosecutions for something
that the courts will find-years later and after tens of thousands or
even millions of dollars of legal expenses-to be no crime at all. Lives
and careers will be ruined for something that is not criminal.
The best short-term hope for preventing such travesties of justice
would be for the Supreme Court to rule that the law is unconstitutionally vague. 0 2 But such a ruling could prove to be of only temporary relief because Congress could pass another law or federal
prosecutors could continue to prosecute alleged insider trading in the
absence of any law prohibiting it, as they have been doing for years.
Our best long-term hope would be for further studies to be made that
isolate the individuals or groups, if such groups exist, whose rights
are violated by insider trading. Congress could then pass clearlyworded legislation that prevents any fraud from being committed
against these individuals and groups, while allowing nonfraudulent
transactions to be completed without fear of prosecution. Where there
is no force, fraud, or breach of contract, it is highly questionable
that placing restrictions on the trading of securities is justified. Until
it can be clearly determined that someone's rights are being violated
by insider trading, there should be no law or regulation restricting the
practice because such restrictions could violate individual rights and
will likely produce a negative market reaction.

102. Vagueness is only one of the problems with which potential inside traders
must contend. Insider trading laws are also arbitrary and differ from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. Another problem, not only with insider trading laws but with all laws,
is that prosecutors go beyond the wording of the law itself by examining the law's
legislative history. If the legislative history is more favorable to the prosecutor's
position than is the law, the prosecutor will cite whatever language from the legislative
history that serves the purpose. Unfortunately, judges often consider such evidence
when making their rulings. The result is that individuals may be fined or imprisoned
even though they have not violated the language of the law. As far back as 1948,
Justice Felix Frankfurter pointed out the danger of looking at what the legislature
meant to do rather than what it actually did. See Hunt for Laws' 'True' Meaning
Subverts Justice, The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 31, 1989, at 18, col. 3.

